Why prisoners of Auschwitz did not start a revolt?

Transcript of the podcast

One of the questions about Auschwitz is why the prisoners, who outnumbered the SS guards, never started a general revolt or uprising. Dr. Piotr Setkiewicz and Dr. Wanda Witek-Malicka of the Museum Research Center discuss the impact of the first contact with the camp reality, the adaptation to the conditions of existence and the possibilities of starting a revolt among the prisoners.

We wish to thank Jonathan Jetter from the Right Angle Productions & Brooke Stocken for their help in production of the English version of the podcast.

Frequent reflection for example among the visitors of the Auschwitz Memorial concerns a huge number of prisoners incarcerated at the Auschwitz camp compared to a relatively limited number of its staff members supervising the prisoners. How did these proportions look like within the period of the functioning of Auschwitz?

In the very first period of operations of Auschwitz, a relatively small number of prisoners were incarcerated there. In 1940, it would reach six, seven thousand. The following year, new prisoners began to arrive in transports; however, mortality rate grew significantly in that time, as a result of which the number of prisoners remained at a relatively low level of ten, eleven thousand people. The situation changed as late as in 1942 together with big transports coming to Auschwitz, especially with Jews dispersed at the time throughout nearly the entire Germany-occupied Europe. Thus, the number of prisoners increased up to more than sixty thousand people in the early 1944 and as many as over 100 thousand in the summer of 1944. Nevertheless, it has to be emphasized that not all prisoners would simultaneously remain within the same site, as an important part of them were incarcerated within Auschwitz main camp, situated at the distance of two kilometres from the Birkenau camp, and finally, a lot of prisoners were located in the sub-camps of the Monowitz camp, so in numerous industrial camps within the Upper Silesia region, many kilometres away from the main camp. So potential coordination of such activities could refer in fact exclusively to the camps Auschwitz I, Auschwitz II, optionally the camp in Monowitz, which totalled about 50 thousand people.
I know that in the spring of 1944 German authorities prepared some kind of report referring to the possibility of potential successful prisoners’ uprising or the attempt of some escape. It resulted from the fact that Auschwitz found itself within the reach of American bombers taking off from the bases in Italy and worries arouse that during bombing, when for example part of fencing may get damaged, prisoners may undertake the attempt to liberate themselves, to escape on a mass scale. In connection with this fact, appropriate response plan was drawn up. It was at the time expected that the SS men would face only some of the prisoners, about 15 thousand people in the main camp, more or less the same number of prisoners from Birkenau, about 20 thousand women also incarcerated in the Birkenau camp. And they were also considering whether the prisoners from Monowitz should also be taken into consideration, about 7 thousand of them. Nevertheless it has to be kept in mind that a lot of prisoners were ill, remained in camp hospitals or their condition would not allow them to undertake any fight or attempt to escape. So, in practice, it was estimated that a possible group of those capable of such activity amounted to about 20 thousand men from both Auschwitz and Birkenau. SS garrison at the time consisted of slightly over 2 thousand men and such ration would be preserved throughout the entire period of the functioning of Auschwitz. The number of SS men compared to prisoners, it was more or less 1 to 10, and in practice we can refer to such division of power.

Thus a question emerges, why the prisoners, so visibly outnumbering SS staff, did not undertake a mutiny attempt, did not attack the SS men or organise mass escape from the camp?

It has to be noticed first of all that the question itself concerning why the prisoners did not revolt, it includes some component, some belief, that it was the question of their will, their decision. But when we approach this issue from the perspective of social sciences, from the point of view of social psychology, here the question to what extent the prisoners possessed any will in the camp, to what extent they would have even been able to undertake such activity, it is no longer so unambiguous. One needs to remember how the procedure of arrival at the camp looked like. It assumed a number of techniques, social engineering techniques, aimed at physical and psychological enslavement of prisoners. And it was genuine enslavement.

In the sense that the prisoners, while entering the camp, were convinced of their total powerlessness, complete inability to act. When we read prisoners’ accounts carefully we can indicate in them some fixed components of such procedure, in particular when we refer to the procedure of receiving political prisoners, because the situation looked a little different when it comes to the arrival of the transports of Jews sentenced to mass extermination. But in the case of the said political prisoners, in particular during the first years of operations of the camp, this procedure was extremely brutal. It was all the time accompanied by deliberately created hastiness. Prisoners recall that they were constantly rushed, beaten, ordered to hurry up. They were forced to run to the camp. Permanent time pressure was present and this made the prisoners incapable of any reaction, of setting any paths of sensible self-defence against the atrocities they experienced in the camp. I mean they were able to avoid blows, react to the commands given, but they were unable to look around the area, to notice the situation around them, as all orders from the moment of their unloading were performed hastily and accompanied by a lot of brutality. So here it is on one hand connected with extreme informational overload. A lot of stimuli falling on them and on the other hand, authentic, real threat to their life. The danger of being beaten, shot already while entering the camp.

And when we read the accounts of former prisoners, carefully concentrate on their testimonies, a lot of them claim that yes, shock was indeed their first reaction. It was disbelief and most of all fear and their reactions to the procedures upon arrival were very instinctive, for example avoiding a blow, trying to escape from authentic danger. Then the prisoners would fall into camp reality, which was for them totally unexpected and in which all cause and effect relationships known from free life would turn out not to work. All their behaviours would turn out to be inappropriate in given circumstances. In social sciences such condition is referred to as normative anomie, when the standards known from everyday life become suspended and not applicable in any way. We can find in prisoners’ accounts the fragments in which they describe their disorientation as while reacting in a way that they would normally do it outside the camp, it suddenly turns out that they expose themselves to a huge danger. A prisoner, who during the formation of the first roll call reports the need to go to the toilet, in a way that you think you should do it, suddenly gets beaten by a kapo. So here this powerlessness and the lack of knowledge on how to behave, what to do in order to avoid this beating and brutality resulted in prisoners being totally paralyzed by this fear, this dread. Within the initial stage of their incarceration at the camp they were incapable of creating any effective scenarios for their actions. Because in our everyday lives we do not even realize in how many social situations, practically all of them, we act on a kind of functional autopilot. Some behaviours are automatic, some scenarios permanent and obvious. So prisoners entering the camp would try and behave in the same way, while it very often resulted in aggression and exposing their life to danger. Antoni Kępiński, while referring to this very first moment of entering the camp, called it a nightmare. And it seems an appropriate analogy. Just like a nightmare which is full of unusual things, those that seem irrational and unreal. But at the same time one cannot do anything about it, does not possess any power, any possibility to act or oppose the course of events. And this reflects to some extent the psychological setting in which prisoners would remain in these first moments of their incarceration in the camp.

Researchers involved in studying the subject of prisoners’ adaptation, in the area of social studies or psychiatry and psychology, agree in general that this adaptation to camp life, constituting a necessary element of entering the new reality, can be divided into two stages. The first one was characterized by: feeling totally incapable of anything, completely deprived of the influence on anything. The shock as well. This stage was accompanied by panic, fear that would totally paralyze a prisoner’s ability to undertake any initiative. They were faced with the situation in which the only thing they were able to do was to react in the simplest possible way, instinctively, to the appearing stimuli. It has to be kept in mind all the time that these stimuli, or the majority of them, were considered by the prisoners dangerous, life-threatening. This compulsion, instinctive feeling of the necessity to remain alive, constituted another element influencing the behaviour that made any reflection difficult for the prisoners. It seems to me that when we refer to whether the prisoners were capable of organizing any rebellion and we consider why they didn’t do it, having this ability to make their choices in mind, then here, at this first stage of adaptation to camp reality it seems to me that from the simple psychological point of view there was no such option. The prisoners were unable to organize any mutiny as they were incapable of establishing these effective scenarios for their behaviour.

They were unable to recognize this reality, so radically different than the normal.
In the period that followed the prisoners would adapt more and more effectively, even though it also has to be considered here that the process of adaptation to camp life did not constitute a zero-one phenomenon. It rather has to be described as spread over a certain axis. From this initial panic and initial instinctive reactions to the increased level of adaptation. And of course the prisoners in all this, in their attempts at various levels of this adaptation, would stop and reach different levels. Prisoners’ adaptation would take place within various fields. From the simplest one, so physical, or even physiological adaptation. Prisoners living in the camp were subjected to continuous stress and pressure. It was accompanied by constant fear. This would cause typically neurotic psychosomatic reactions. And this formed another harsh element, also hindering the first stage of adaptation. All these symptoms that we know as reactions to stress either from the digestive system or perception disorders, memory impairment, limited perception, it all accompanied prisoners’ lives during their first days at the camp. Only in the course of time, when they got familiar with that reality, with the camp, when they began to understand a little better its rules, this stress would get partially reduced and this feeling of controlling the emotions, controlling the body would be restored. However, it would never come back completely, as the depravation of these basic needs, leading to strong biological degradation, it constituted the experience shared by nearly all prisoners throughout the period of their incarceration at the camp.

Together with the adaptation at the physiological level, the cognitive aspect was of major importance. Changing the way of thinking, consisting in certain sensitivity reduction. A concentration camp prisoner would encounter on a daily basis numerous gruesome and terrible images and phenomena. Those that we do not see normally, do not encounter. They witnessed other prisoners being beaten, murdered. They saw corpses being transported to the crematorium. All this made it necessary for the prisoners to readjust their perception in order not to ignore such things, but rather limit their sensitivity towards them.

This change in perception consisted not only in this sensitivity reduction, but also in establishing some kind of action on autopilot. This is what I’ve mentioned at the beginning, that in various social situations we tend to act automatically, without reflection. Camp prisoners were forced to develop new reactions and reflexes, new ways and mechanisms of acting and reacting to everyday situations. Such mechanisms that would be adjusted to the situation. So standing at the attention when you see an SS man, taking your hat off, reacting to or noticing these elements of reality that pose an authentic threat, but ignoring those that only seem dangerous. While within the first stage of incarceration at the camp a prisoner would react with fear to heavy steps in the block hall or to explosions at night, then in the course of time, as I have read in prisoners’ accounts, if prisoners heard shots at night, then they would know that it was not the danger posing a direct threat. That it is a stimulus that you can ignore because it probably means that some prisoner went, as it was commonly called, “to the fence”, so committed suicide.

The switch in these cognitive mechanisms consisting in gaining more and more experience and understanding of authentic threat and ignoring the other. Also some kind of recognition of this camp reality, realizing which prisoner functionaries were really dangerous, which maybe a little less and which workplaces are considered better ones. Where you can provide yourself with some level of security, which behaviours increase your chances of survival. In which kommando you can get extra food ration and in which one it is possible to work inside not to get cold. So all these purely informative elements of knowledge acquired in the course of time resulted in the prisoner’s increasing level of adaptation. And we can state here that adaptation consisted in gradually shifting from this initial egoism. This egoism, egocentrism, so perceiving the reality through one’s own perspective, forced by the circumstances. Excessive amount of stimuli would make the prisoner incapable of making observations, noticing which of his inmates was suffering, it was only necessary to watch out for the danger awaiting them. But in the course of time, this shift from egocentrism to developing social networks would emerge. The prisoner would get acquainted with people first in smaller, then in larger groups. And these strategies would evolve from those very basic, instinctive ones related to protecting one’s own life towards these collective strategies, so cooperation in order to protect a bigger group of people.

This initial automatism of reaction, as I’ve described it, so purely escapist activity, escape, protection, would gradually evolve towards this automatism, but already learnt and directed at planning further actions. So a prisoner would no longer concentrate exclusively on avoiding to get beaten, but would also aim at taking care of the future, finding this better kommando or better conditions to survive. Shifting from this cognitive chaos, from chaos in everyday reality to a certain level of stabilization. So finding one’s own place in the network of social relations and organisational structure of the camp.

So is it possible to determine how long this adaptation stage lasted?

It was very individualised and it is impossible to determine here a specific point in time that could show that a prisoner needed one week, month or year. Some prisoners would adapt to camp reality much more quickly and would establish their position much sooner. But it depended to a large extent on one’s cultural capital while entering the camp. This capital included the people they knew before the war, their pre-war social status, life experience. Also to some extent their age. It was for sure easier to cope for those prisoners who were transported to the camp in a group, for example a group of friends arrested at the same time, because from the very beginning, they formed part of a group whose members could support one another. It could also be easier for example for military men, because military drill introduced at the camp, so for example the command to form groups of five, perform the orders, to act under this pressure of commands and tasks was easier for them. They did not have to learn the rules of drill, so at that moment they were a little less vulnerable to some sanctions. For sure the people in good physical condition. They were less vulnerable as well. They would also cope better within the first stage. Definitely higher chances to survive were shared by the prisoners who, right after being transported to the camp, met there their pre-war of pre-camp friends who already had their situation at the camp somehow stabilized. Who found themselves already within those safe networks of relationships and we know the examples of such prisoners who, thanks to the fact that they knew somebody, then old prisoners would immediately take care of them upon their arrival at the camp. In this way their chances to survive would increase. Such example, one of the most prominent, is probably constituted by the fate of Ksawery Dunikowski who, taking into consideration his age upon the arrival at the camp and the fact that he was a member of intelligentsia, not a specialist, then in practice his chances to survive were very low. But almost from the very beginning he could count on the support of other prisoners who already remained in the camp and he probably survived thanks to this fact.

You have mentioned a group of military men, already in the first months of functioning of the Auschwitz camp this group began to establish their associations, the origins of camp conspiracy.

Yes, because it was quite obvious to those people to undertake quasi-military activities even while remaining in a concentration camp, so in particular to organize themselves, to find people who would lead such groups. It most often referred to officers, but not necessarily, who before the deportation to Auschwitz obtained higher army ranks, immediately other soldiers had the ability to get subjected to such individuals. These people should, at least in theory, possess some organizational skills, some abilities to control the functioning of such resistance movement unit. Such groups began to emerge in Auschwitz during the first months of camp operations. They on one hand consisted of former military men, on the other they were also the people with strong ideological bonds, so those conducting some political activity before the war, there were also socialists at Auschwitz. So it was the group formed by the activists of Polish Socialist Party. Initially, though, these attempts to establish camp conspiracy would mainly concentrate around former military environment, who often knew each other from before the war or from trainings that they had undergone within the same units. It was also easy to gain the trust for those people because they were well known, but it was also assumed that a military man should represent some values that made it possible to believe that they were for example incapable of treason. It was extremely important. The very first camp conspiracy units were established among such people, and they would develop. It was not only the group led by captain Witold Pilecki, but also other groups concentrated around other military officers that, in the course of time, by recognizing one another and noticing that such organizations existed within the camp, began to unite in order to undertake joint actions.

It was the beginning of this organized camp conspiracy, at least when it comes to Polish prisoners. Because here it was of course easier, as initially there were more Poles in the camp and it of course referred to officers and professional soldiers of the Polish Army. But the prisoners who would later arrive from other countries, in particular Jewish ones, they usually did not have such experience, such opportunities, concentrating around former soldiers was not possible either, which resulted from a number of issues. In particular probably from the fact that they were Jews transported from many different countries, and then that their path towards reaching this stability at the camp was usually harder and longer. In practice it meant that these prisoners could cooperate with one another within the groups of functionary prisoners, those within which they managed to find some relatively safe kommandos. It was never possible to say that some kind of work or some position at the camp would ensure a certain level of security. But for sure the people who worked for example in camp warehouses, or some workshops, they had higher chances of survival. They were able to go in their perception beyond the horizon of a few next days. In connection with this fact, they would form the foundations of such organizations. They began to help one another and could notice that it was bringing positive effects. As a result, as described by captain Pilecki, a group of Poles was established, members of this organization, distinguished even by their appearance, from the entire crowd of other prisoners. Their stripped uniforms were clean, they in general looked stronger and healthier, while the life of other prisoners was harder and this organization would rarely reach as high level among them as within the group of Polish military men.

Were the plans for inciting the uprising or for prisoners’ self-liberation to any extent realistic? Were there any chances of their success?

It is a hard question. I think that in specific circumstances of the Auschwitz camp it was exclusively possible to incite some rebellion that could result in a mass escape attempt. And such activities were being prepared at the camp. However, it seems that the expectations towards such uprising, even among sensible conspirators, were excessive. It resulted to some extent from great motivation to oppose the SS men. From excessive hope that thanks to outnumbering the SS, even making a big sacrifice, it would still be possible to defeat them. Because there are so many of us… The plans assumed the crystallization of an initiative-driving group of prisoners having a plan and trying to somehow bring it to life. Those who, at the agreed moment, favourable for their plans, would perform it upon a specific command. And all other prisoners, even if not involved in camp conspiracy, would get carried away by this plan and follow in the footsteps of these fighters who would attack the Germans within the first moments of this uprising. So it was a plan that could not have become true. No one should have any doubts about it considering also other attempts of this kind being undertaken, either later at Auschwitz or in other similar concentration camps. Where it would turn out that such plan, assuming the attack on a few SS men, depriving them of their weapons, then with their use shooting more SS men, depriving them of their weapons etc., it was just impossible to get implemented, because sooner or later, the alarm would be raised. The speed at which camp staff was able to organize themselves, arrive at the scene of such event… It is necessary to remember that Auschwitz had its alarm sub-division, there were lorries available at any moment. So virtually any time, this alarm sub-division, ready to act, armed, could be transported with this lorry to any location in the vicinity of the Auschwitz camp where such incidents could take place.

Maybe from the psychological point of view the conspirators just wanted to believe that such plan of self-liberation could be possible, but adopting a realistic perspective, it is very questionable. And in fact all these plans, not only developed by Pilecki’s organization, but also by other conspirational units within the camp, were the same. If we take a look at further organizational plans by the PPS, so the idea to trigger the uprising by Sonderkommando prisoners. They would assume that a relatively small group of prisoners was enough to significantly weaken SS forces within this first stage. For example, the plan by specialist organization would state that about probably 2000 prisoners could be enough, you know. That over 600 such determined fighters would first attack the SS men. They would attack the SS garrison in the number of 200 people, and 100 prisoners per each post within large guard chain would be enough, 50 to liberate the female camp. It was totally unrealistic. As the prisoners possessed practically no means to defend themselves, the SS men were equipped with firearms, it’s true that these were not some latest models, but totally enough and operational in order to keep under control those vulnerable prisoners. One can read somewhere in survivors’ accounts that they heard that there was some conspirational weapons depot at the camp. It is false. That the prisoners had some grenades or guns at their disposal, which they obtained in various ways. It was false, too. While the Germans, the SS men, possessed a significant arsenal, limited in fact mainly to some ordinary rifles, Mauser98. Was this weapon later replaced by Czech wz.24 rifles? They also had automatic rifles, or machine guns and grenades.

What’s more, taking into consideration that Auschwitz was located within an open area, where the only forest would in fact be the forest in Birkenau and potential hiding places were situated far away, it was necessary to keep in mind that during such mutiny, such uprising, many hours would be necessary to reach some hiding places. This would give the SS men enough time to call for help, as here it was necessary to bear in mind not only the intervention of the entire garrison of over 2000 SS men within the immediate vicinity of Auschwitz and Birkenau, but also the SS men that could be transported from other sub-camps, for example from Monowitz, an important contingent of Luftwaffe troops, about 800 men who operated anti-aircraft cannons supposed to protect IG Farben plant against American air raids. Finally, police formations were stationed in Oświęcim. And gendarmes. There were those quasi-military troops, later used by the Germans to form the Auschwitz Volkssturm Batallion. So it can be estimated that in 1944, at Auschwitz and in its nearest vicinity there were about 5000 armed SS men and soldiers representing other formations.

We also have to remember that the Germans of course had the possibility to call in some reinforcements from other garrisons and military units from the Upper Silesia region. There was the case when a dozen SS men from the Ukrainian campaign rebelled and began their escape towards the forest, in the area of Chełmek or Libiąż, they were easily stopped by local police posts and soon after the Germans were able to gather over 500 gendarmes, the soldiers of Wehrmacht and other police formations, which would of course give them huge advantage over a dozen Ukrainians.

If we take into consideration all these aspect that you have mentioned here, that any form of self-liberation was rather impossible, then another assumption can be made that the visions of this future moment of self-liberation made it possible to preserve the hope and the feeling of some future ability to act?

I think that yes, this constituted an important component of psychological self-defence. In fact each prisoner incarcerated at the camp would dream of getting out of this institution. Many of them used to think how they could escape, even if unconsciously they felt that they would never be able to make it. But these dreams of leaving the camp and maybe not defeating the SS men, but at least escaping, they were for sure for them the source of power and hope that there exists something outside the camp, something is waiting for them, a different life and maybe they will come back there. We know it from prisoners’ accounts that this psychological self-defence, escaping in one’s thoughts outside the camp in any way, it was crucial to increase the chances to survive in order for the prisoners not to break down.

On the other hand it is necessary to remember that to the prisoners, at least some of them, it seemed rational that they were not alone, that they could count on some assistance from the outside. And here, from their points of view, such activities as the uprising or mass escape were not totally irrational assuming that in fact at a given moment, when a predefined signal is given, some joint coordinated action will be possible to be undertaken by the prisoners and guerrilla units from the outside, then the chances for such uprising would not be so completely minimal. But the prisoners could not know how limited the forces were in fact, in particular those of the Home Army, but also other units forming partisan troops in the area, how weak they were. We know it from the members of this resistance movement around the camp that at the distance of a dozen kilometres from Oświęcim there could be about 40-50 guerrillas carrying any kind of weapon. Not only guns and rifles. But camp conspiracy members would also expect that in such case total concentration of Home Army troops would not be possible, that even if there are not many guerrillas in the immediate vicinity of Oświęcim, then maybe it will be possible to have them brought from any other location. It was not that simple either, how would it be possible? They would be forced to ride or march on some forest paths. It was very hard in practice and the commanders of the Home Army were aware of this fact and finally, they never gave their consent for such action. But for sure the preparations to some uprising or the attempts to organize, potential attempts to collect primitive weapons, they could have some sense in the situation when the SS men would begin mass executions of prisoners in face of the approaching frontline. Because this constituted a common source of apprehension among the prisoners, that for sure the SS men would not keep us alive as we had witnessed their crimes. So in this particular situation, even quite desperate plans consisting simply in burning the barracks, which could constitute a signal for some guerrilla members from the area, to come to the rescue. Here it was not even about rescuing a big number of prisoners, but to rescue anybody. Then such plan, in fact quite desperate, would be justified.

If we consider whether such plans for the uprising could take place it is necessary to look also at the aspect connected with psycho-cultural reality of the camp. We are inclined to assume that the prisoners formed a uniform group, united in its suffering, solidarizing in it and in fact thinking in a very similar way. While in fact we need to remember that the Auschwitz concentration camp, its reality was formed by the community consisting of the representatives of many different European cultures, different religious systems, political options, the representatives of different levels of the social ladder. So this community was not absolutely unified. Already while entering the camp… these people used to speak different languages. If we assume that any form of self-liberation or uprising activity could have taken place, then the prisoners would have to communicate with one another in some way, which was impossible in such a big community. It was impossible to make all prisoners informed. Camp authorities would have got familiar with it for sure. Prisoners’ community was not homogenous also when it comes to their situation at the camp and it is worth to remember that the situation of a prisoner who worked physically in an external kommando, worked in the field, was incapable of finding additional food, could not hide. He or she simply worked in a bad and dangerous kommando, it was totally different than the situation of a prisoner who was a specialist employed in camp workshops. These specialist kommandos, usually with a limited number of members, with lower rotation rate, they were organized in a totally different way, completely different relationships would emerge inside them, and some solidarity between the prisoners could in fact take place there. Some communication. But in big external kommandos it was hardly probable. These specialist kommandos would also create much higher chances for survival and completely different psychological circumstances. I mean these prisoners were not so much desperate. They did not have so much to lose. When I’m reading the texts, for example by Borowski, also Victor Frankl mentions it, in some cases the prisoners were making escape plans, but they would finally conclude that their situation at the camp was not so bad. Not so dangerous. That remaining at the camp was connected with lower risk than making the attempt to escape that can finish in death. So the situation at the camp was not the same for all prisoners, and thus they would not share the same objectives and needs. It is also quite visible when we read the notes of Sonderkommando members. When Sonderkommando members express even directly some kind of regret towards camp conspiracy, that they wanted to make the uprising attempt, some mutiny, while camp conspiracy would hold their plans back. And the key argument, that would make the situation much different here, consisted in the fact that non-Jewish prisoners, not employed at Sonderkommando remaining at the camp… The argument explaining while Sonderkommando prisoners were more willing to make a mutiny attempt, wanted to conduct it as soon as possible, was that from their own perspective, they practically had nothing to lose. As witnesses of extermination, they were convinced that they were doomed to death anyway. That the only thing they could still do it was either the attempt to escape, in which maybe someone will be able to do it and maybe they will manage to destroy mass extermination devices, maybe it will be possible, if not totally, to at least limit the extent of extermination, they were more motivated indeed for the mutiny to take place as soon as possible. While camp conspiration members did not feel this pressure so strongly.

It is necessary to remember what kind of experience people could have at that time, not only prisoners. I mean, how this war was supposed to finish. Probably no one would expect that the Germans would be defending themselves until the last moment. It was commonly thought that the war would finish in the same way as World War One – by sudden collapse of Germany. Just as it was the case in 1918, so with soldiers’ rebellions, some mass strikes in Germany initiated by desperate people fed up with the war, during World War Two additionally exposed to mass air raids. So it was not so irrational, because there was the attempt of a military coup – Operation Valkyrie. So on one hand the prisoners were afraid that when Allied forces really confront or when the end of the war becomes somehow closer, the Germans will decide to organize mass executions in order to kill all prisoners. On the other, some of them believed that maybe it is not worth to take the risk as the war will finish somehow, sooner or later. Maybe they will manage to survive and then regain freedom with the end of the war. Divagations on this subject, whether they will be able to survive, were not so unambiguous. However, while reading survivors’ accounts, one can really conclude that some of them expected the Germans to make the attempt to kill all prisoners before the end of the war.

I have mentioned that planning such revolt would be extremely difficult, together with informing the prisoners that the action of this kind would be undertaken. Pilecki assumed that when the uprising breaks out, these commanders will make a crowd of prisoners follow them. And that this surprise element will constitute something that will act in favour of the prisoners. The surprise factor of the SS garrison, not expecting the mutiny and somehow defenceless at the very first moment. But it seems to me that this element of surprise would act as something unfavourable for the prisoners’ community. We should consider whether the prisoners remaining at the camp, deprived of any knowledge concerning self-liberation plans, that such event is going to take place and that they are supposed to take an active part in it. Whether really in these crisis circumstances, if they would simply join it. Because the knowledge that we possess in the area of social psychology, the psychology of crowd shows that it would rather be not so probable. People in the crowd act in some way automatically, instinctively, but panic spreads much easier, hysteric reactions, escape reactions rather than reactions consisting in actually deciding to act. What is more, psychology describes such phenomenon as informational social influence. It means that when we do not know how to behave, when we are confronted with a situation that we do not understand, to which we are unprepared, then we base the decision on what to do on other people’s behaviour. So if the majority of prisoners had been disoriented, then most probably they would not have undertaken this action, would have remained passive. All the more so that passivity and avoiding the unknown consisted one of the strategies of survival at the camp, developed by a vast majority of prisoners. The prisoners knew that in order to survive, it was most of all necessary to remain unnoticed. One should rather hide behind the crowd or inside the crowd than stand out. It was always connected with danger.

So this passivity learned at the camp as an effective strategy I think could here successfully hinder the activity of a crowd of prisoners. I do not state that prisoners for sure would not take up the fight, but that the probability is very low.